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The present paper studies among other issues the effects on equity and efficiency of two classic
principles of international capital taxation: the principle of residence and the principle of source. In
addition, it discusses harmonization and tax competition policies in corporate taxation, aiming at
establishing which should be the future of taxation of capital in Europe. Finally, the paper analyses
und justifies the new approaches of "levelling the playing field" in capital taxation that are currently
supported by the European Commission.
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Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht unter anderem die Effekte zweier klassischer Prinzipien der
internationalen Kapitalbesteuerung auf die Gerechtigkeit und die Effizienz: das Bestimmungsland-
und das Ursprungslandprinzip. Weiterhin werden die Harmonisierungs- und die Steuerwettbewerbs-
politik in der Unternehmensbesteuerung diskutiert, um die wünschenswerte Zukunft in der Besteue-
rung von Kapitals in Europa darzustellen. Abschließend werden in dem Beitrag die neuen Ansätze
in der Kapitalbesteuerung, die gegenwärtig durch die Europäische Kommission unterstützt werden,
analysiert und begründet.
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werb, Besteuerung und internationale Kapitalbewegungen
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1 INTRODUCTION
Harmonization of capital taxation is a process that can be seen from two opposing views. On one side
are those that fervently defend the process, fearful that capital taxation revenues will otherwise suffer
because of increasing possibilities for evasion. On the other side are those who reject harmonization
and block any advances in this area, wary of loss of sovereignty in this field to the detriment of
national interests. Such countries make it impossible to reach the unanimity that the European Union
(EU) requires in order to approve any tax regulation measures. This lack of agreement has caused the
harmonization of capital taxation to shift from ambitious objectives toward a more pragmatic view,
focussed merely on coordinating those essential points that distort the smooth running of the EU, i.e.,
levelling the playing field.
The 1992 Ruding Report and its favorable reception from the Commission is proof of this "levelling
the essentials" view. The conclusions were most circumspect when compared to previous
harmonization projects, such as the grandiose proposals in the 1975 Directive on the harmonization of
corporate tax and dividend withholding systems. The Report stated that complete harmonization of
corporate taxes is not justified at the present time, and that EU actions should instead concentrate on
overcoming fiscal distortions affecting international investment, fixing minimum criteria for
calculating the tax base, establishing a band of general tax rates of between 30 % and 40 % and
placing strict constraints on tax incentives. But in spite of all this, the Commission abandoned the
Ruding Report. Indeed, in the communiqué that it sent to the Council and Parliament, it warned
against the excessive harmonization of the tax base advocated in the Report and stated that it would
not be advisable to establish a minimum rate of 30 percent, as this would make the Community
vulnerable to third-country competition. Thus, it seems that for the moment no substantial
harmonization of capital taxation is likely.  However, since the question of corporate tax
harmoniziation is nowhere near being settled (1996 Monti Report), it is still necessary to analyze the
economic effects of harmonization and tax liability with special emphasis on the implications for
efficiency and fairness.2 Harmonization of Corporate Taxes and Economic Efficiency 3
2 HARMONIZATION OF CORPORATE TAXES AND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY
2.1 Harmonization and Efficiency in Investment Location: Differences in
the Cost of International Capital
Allocation efficiency is a difficult term to define, although the conviction that the major factor of
efficiency is neutrality is gaining momentum. In the international sphere the main distortion of
neutrality is capital migration due to fiscal differences. It is therefore important to delve into the effects
of taxes on international capital allocation. But first it is necessary to define the major principles of
fiscal neutrality in the international location of capital, the Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) and the
Capital Import Neutrality (CIN).
The principle of CEN reflects a situation in which taxpayers are not influenced by fiscal systems when
deciding whether to invest abroad or in their own country (Musgrave, 1987). This principle is
observed when capital earnings are only taxed in the investor's country of residence and when there is
no fiscal discrimination between the earnings obtained out of or within the country, e.g. when the full
imputation system is used as a corrective mechanism for double taxation (Sato and Bird, 1975), which,
ceteris paribus, causes capital to flow between countries until pre-tax earning rates are comparable
and, since these rates tend to reflect the marginal productivity of capital, brings about efficient
placement of international investment (OECD, 1991).
The CIN principle prevails when foreign and national investors (those financing investments) obtain
the same rate of return in a given country after tax on their capital (Gardner, 1992), ensuring that a
company is not competitively disadvantaged by operating in a certain market as the result of fiscal
differences with its country of residence (Daly, 1994). This principle is observed when out-of-country
earnings are tax-exempt, which is the same as application of the taxation principle known as the source
principle and using the exemption method as a corrective mechanism to international double taxation
(Sato and Bird 1975). CIN attempts to ensure that the investment agent is the one that produces goods
and services most efficiently (Deveraux and Pearson, 1989; CEPS, 1992) and ensures an efficient
allocation of savings between the various countries (OECD 1991).
Neutrality criteria in international location of capital acquire relevance within the process of European
integration in their ability to level the playing field, or, in other words, to define an economic context
in which taxes do not discriminate against some countries in terms of attracting capital and companies.
For this to occur, companies that sell in one country have to carry the same tax burden, regardless of
whether their products are manufactured in that country or imported from another, and regardless ofHARMONIZATION AND TAX COMPETITION 4
who the owners are, requiring simultaneous attainment of CEN and CIN. As this is almost impossible
to achieve, with few exceptions, there is no alternative but to consider the different focuses entailed in
the two types of neutrality.
Normally, the choice between CEN and CIN is determined by elasticity considerations (Giovanni,
1989; OECD 1991). Distortions are determined as a function of savings elasticity  relative to interest
rates and investment elasticity relative to capital costs. When the first one prevails over the other one,
the principle of residence or of the source is preferable, respectively. The problem is that both
elasticities vary as time goes by and differ for different countries and types of investment, so it is
difficult to conclude unequivocally which of the two neutrality objectives in capital location is most
desirable. Thus, given that available empirical information for both types of elasticity seems to show
that  savings elasticity is less than investment elasticity, relative to interest rates, it is possible that,
according to this approach, the CEN objective is less distorting than the CIN (Tanzi, 1995).
An alternative approach is to consider location specific rents (Deveraux and Peearson, 1989). This
approach is based on the fact that more efficient companies and locations can obtain extra earnings,
which are added to the normal economic revenues earned by the rest of the companies competing in
that market. Thus, many countries collect part of their corporate tax revenues as a result of a "location
specific rent", generated precisely because companies are operating or producing from a certain
country. These rents are normally of two types: a levy on production, when it is cheaper to produce
goods and services in one country or region, and a levy on residence, when a company is more
efficient regardless of where it operates. According to this approach, it seems more efficient to obtain
CEN rather than CIN (Deveraux and Pearson, 1989), since the efficiency advantages of investment in
a specific location seem to be greater than the differences of efficiency between companies.
The third approach is to consider tax transfers. If capital taxation is transferred to the source of
earnings, then neutrality can only be attained with CIN (Kopits, 1992), since it allows each country to
establish its tax in accordance with its specific levels of tax transfer of capital taxation, different for
each country. The same results can be achieved if we consider that capital taxation adheres to the profit
principle, by which capital is located according to the trade-off between the capital itself and public
spending which increases capital productivity.
Another approach is the modern view of capital taxation (Zodrow, 1991). It recalls that CEN is based
on the assumption that the decision to repatriate dividends from one country to another is independent
of the fiscal treatment of this repatriation, since the relevant concept is the guarantee that there is no
difference between investing abroad and repatriating dividends, or investing within the country.2 Harmonization of Corporate Taxes and Economic Efficiency 5
However, if tax issues affect repatriation decisions (Hartman, 1985; Auberbach and Hasset, 1993;
Altshuler, Newlon and Randolph, 1995) and the repatriation of dividends were excessively taxed,
companies could opt for reinvesting earnings abroad as a mechanism to finance foreign investment. In
that case, CEN would not be as important as CIN, i.e., all companies operating in a certain country
would be affected by the same effective tax rate, whether they were national or foreign owned.
Thus, according to the elasticities and location specific rents approach, CEN seems more desirable
than CIN. Nonetheless, elasticities can vary over time and convergence of economies makes
production revenues less important, so that this preference could change in the future. However,
according  to the transfer tax approach, the profit principle and the modern view of taxation, CIN is
preferable to CEN. Because of this, in our judgement, after weighting the various approaches, it seems
more desirable to obtain CIN than CEN. In other words, we could conclude that the principle of source
is preferable to the principle of residence.
This conclusion has been corroborated with results of simulation studies contained in the Ruding
Report, which quantify the effects of tax harmonization on international capital costs. Harmonization
of a correction for international double taxation based on the full imputation system does not reduce
existing discrimination between national and foreign investment. If the correction for international
double taxation is harmonized by using the exemption system, distortion is corrected by about 29 %
(Izquierdo, 1997). It is worth noting that these conclusions differ markedly from those obtained in the
Ruding Report, although in both cases the same tables of results are interpreted. In this sense, there is a
certain inconsistency in the last paragraph of page 77 of the Report, when it affirms, without
specifying which of the two systems it is referring to, that ”adoption of a common imputation system
improves CIN and CEN in the Community more than establishment of a common exemption system”.
All well and good, but the table on page 91 of the same report indicates that under the imputation
system the cost of international capital within the Community is 7.1 %, the same as without any
harmonization, and 6.7 % when a common exemption system is adopted, reducing the gap by 0.4
points.
2.2 Harmonization and competition of companies from the various
countries: Differences in the cost of internal capital
Differences in the fiscal component of the cost of capital can alter conditions of competition of
companies located in different countries. Taxation of capital returns produces a gap betweenHARMONIZATION AND TAX COMPETITION 6
profitability of investment before taxes and of savings after taxes, which has been developed in
numerous studies (King and Fullerton, 1984; OECD 1991 and 1994; Ruding 1992; Jorgenson, 1993;
Rodriguez Ondarza, 1996). Here, however, we shall follow the methodology and assumptions used by
the OECD model in its report ”Taxing Profits in a Global Economy”, which were also used by the
Ruding Report. As they are generally well-known, we will not enter into any great detail (Izquierdo,
1997), although below, we will review the calculation assumptions.
Capital costs have been calculated using the tax systems existing in Europe on 31 December 1995,
except for Spain, where the system used is the one valid as of 1 January 1996. Let us assume that
inflation is at 3.1 %; the real interest rate is at 5 %, and that there are no personal taxes on capital.
Methodology used for analyzing the cost of capital, without taking into account personal taxes or taxes
on international dividend flows is equivalent to accepting the modern view of taxation already
analyzed (Jorgenson and Landau, 1993). Capital cost is calculated for the various types of investment
and financing, and the OECD weightings are used. On the investment side, this means 50 % for
machinery; 28 % for real estate and 22 % for inventories. On the finance side, it means 55 % for
undistributed earnings, 10 % for capital issues and 35 % for debt.
Having reviewed the methodology employed in presenting our results, we can now study the cost of
capital in the EU today, using the assumptions mentioned.  This cost appears in the first column of all
the charts. According to our calculations, the country with the highest capital cost is Germany
(6.35 %), and the one with lowest costs is Italy (5.13 %). In view of the low level of dispersion
indicators (standard deviation indicators of 0.36, and Pearson measure of skewness of 0.06), at present
there are no great differences in capital costs within the various European countries. We will next
analyze variations in capital costs resulting from adoption of various harmonization measures:
equalization of tax rates, of double taxation correction mechanisms, of depreciation methods and of
inventory valuation systems.
Harmonization of tax rates modifies capital costs in a way that varies as a function of the level at
which the rates are harmonized (see chart 1). If we harmonize toward higher rates, e.g. at 40 %, the
average capital cost in the EU is 5.88 % with a Pearson skewness measure of 0.07, i.e., a greater
dispersion than without harmonization at 0.06. Nonetheless, as harmonized rates are reduced, so too
are capital costs and the dispersion. Thus, for example, if rates are reduced to 20 %, the average cost of
capital in the EU is 5.20 % with a Pearson skewness measure of 0.04.
Three simulations have been conducted in harmonization of double taxation correction systems (see
chart 2). Two cover equalization of the full imputation system with a correction of 30 % and of 20 %.2 Harmonization of Corporate Taxes and Economic Efficiency 7
The other analyzes the system that does not correct for double taxation, in other words, a traditional
system of corporate taxes. According to our calculations, neither the comparison of the correction for
double taxation nor the equalization of a traditional system reduce dispersion, as the simulations had a
Pearson skew measure of 0.06, the same as without harmonization.
In similar fashion, mechanisms for calculating depreciation and inventory evaluations can be
harmonized (see chart 3). Three scenarios have been calculated in the first simulation: high
depreciation (decreasing charge amortization at a rate of 30  % for machinery and straight-line
depreciation at a rate of 6 % for buildings) and low depreciation (straight-line depreciation at a rate of
12.5 % for machinery and at a rate of 3 % for buildings). Liberal harmonization reduces the Pearson
skewness measure by only 0.01, bringing it down to 0.05 %. Low harmonization increases dispersion,
since it brings the Pearson skewness measure up to 0.08. Thus, harmonization of the calculation
systems for tax depreciation hardly reduces dispersion, and in certain cases even increases it. In the
simulation of inventory valuation harmonization, two possibilities have been considered for inventory
valuation: the LIFO system, which corrects for inflation, and the FIFO system, which does not take
into account price increases. Harmonization with both systems barely reduces dispersion less than a
hundredth.
In summary, differences in the fiscal component of capital costs are only a small part in view of
dispersion indicators used, and would hardly be sufficient reason for complete harmonization. In any
case, if it would be decided to make the fiscal component of internal capital costs more equal, the
effort should focus on harmonizing rates, since that is the only measure which significantly reduces
dispersion.
2.3 Fiscal harmonization costs in terms of economic efficiency
The fact that the single currency will entail loss of autonomy over monetary policy obliges us to look
to the other policies as long-term stabilization instruments and structural adjustment tools. Among
these, capital taxation stands out as an instrument to counter cyclical trends. By limiting economies'
ability to react to external shocks, this kind of harmonization can constrain the welfare function (Sinn,
1993). Also, it is very difficult for a harmonized fiscal system to be flexible and rapidly adapt to the
kind of changing circumstances that non-Community countries can cause.
Fiscal competition can help to design an optimum capital taxation when there are problems of time
inconsistency, i.e., when governments are not able to follow an optimum fiscal policy in the future
(Giovanni, 1987; Rogoff, 1985). In the absence of any commitment to the contrary, countries tend toHARMONIZATION AND TAX COMPETITION 8
overtax capital, because the capital pile taxed is the outcome of past savings, and thus totally inelastic
(Kehoe, 1989), although agents' decision to invest in- or out-of-country can be made after
announcement of the level of after-tax earnings.
Thirdly, some countries are reluctant to introduce fiscal harmonization because they want to maintain
fiscal structures as manifestation of their economic or social philosophy (CEPS, 1992), especially
when the savings and public expenditure requirements differ enormously between different countries.
Also, tax harmonization per se does not guarantee better allocation of resources within the
Community, since it all depends on which tax-system features harmonization is directed at (Tanzi and
Bovenberg, 1991). Thus, tax reform processes are as important as harmonization. The EU welfare
function can improve if tax systems are optimum, even if they are not completely coordinated.
Fiscal harmonization can also be defended from the perspective of  preventing fiscal competition from
forcing capital taxation to lower levels. This opinion is based on the belief that governments are
philanthropists that only wish to maximize voter utility. However, the theory of social choice (Frey,
1990) has demonstrated that governments mainly act in their own interest, taking advantage of
political cycle imperfections to ensure their re-election. One of the few constraints on excessive public
sector growth is the fact that a country cannot tax its mobile factors of production, e.g., capital, at a
level higher than the rest of  the world without risking capital flight, which would mean reduced levels
of investment and welfare, and the consequent loss of votes. A large part of a positive or negative
evaluation of the effects of harmonization and competition is a function of the starting hypothesis
about the consequences for the public sector in the various EU countries. There is no advantage to
harmonizing savings if differences persist in public expenditure that influence economic activity.3 Fiscal competition implications for fairness 9
3 FISCAL COMPETITION IMPLICATIONS FOR FAIRNESS
Fiscal competition is a situation  in which the various countries design their tax policies individually,
so as to maximize their social welfare functions, and therefore there are no supranational rules to
constrain their actions. When there is fiscal competition, a small open economy cannot tax capital at
source independently (Razin and Sadka, 1994), as its earnings depend on what is going on in the rest
of the world. If capital is internationally mobile, capital owners will transfer their taxation to owners of
immobile factors of production whenever there is any attempt to tax capital at source (Diamond and
Mirlress, 1991). On the other hand, if taxation at source reduced capital earnings, there would be a
flight of capital out of country, which would diminish the total capital pile in the economy, raising
capital earnings to the level which would equal earnings rates worldwide. As the effect of capital taxes
based on the source principle is equivalent, in the case of perfectly mobile capital, to an implicit tax on
labor, it is more efficient to directly reduce earnings obtained by labor instead of doing it by means of
an implicit tax on labor, which would distort not only decisions about leisure/labor trade-offs but also
international investment decisions (Gordon, 1986).
In spite of everything, although taxes on capital returns based on the principle of source may tend to
disappear in a fiscal competition situation, this is not necessarily true of taxes based on the principle of
residence (Razin and Sadka, 1992). In this respect, the theory of optimum taxation suggests that
whenever there is no tax evasion on earnings obtained out-of-country, taxes based on the residence
principle can be an efficient fiscal structure for a small open economy (Bovenberg, 1994).
Nevertheless, reality demonstrates that taxpayers find it easier to evade taxes on out-of-country
earnings than those obtained in their own country. When this happens and it is not possible to enforce
taxes on out-of-country returns, countries are obliged to apply the source principle instead of the
residence principle, even though the level of tax revenues is lower (Gordon, 1990).
The main argument used by supporters of tax harmonization is that the alternative to tax competition
necessarily leads to reduction or even disappearance of capital taxation. This belief is based on fear of
widespread use of foreign investment as an evasion mechanism (Schjelderup, 1993; Frenkel, Razin
and Sadka, 1991). Further, as small countries find themselves with increasing difficulty in taxing
capital (Kanbur and Keen, 1993), there could come a time when they would switch sides and become
tax havens (Bond and Samuelson, 1989), which adds to the risk of lower revenues from capital
taxation. Nonetheless, while it is true that tax competition in the various countries limits their ability to
collect more revenues than in a harmonized situation, this does not automatically lead to theHARMONIZATION AND TAX COMPETITION 10
disappearance of tax revenues, as can be seen in nowadays Europe, where although there is no
harmonization, capital taxation is still alive and well (and kicking).
The main reason such taxation has survived in open economies lies in tax transfers. Despite lack of
information on the degree of capital taxation transfers, theoretical models suggest that in open
economies with free movement of factors, tax is transferred to less mobile factors of  production, e.g.,
labor or real estate. This has two important implications: If the tax burden is transferred until the
profitability of national investment is equal to the rest of the world, the diversity of rates, rather than
distorting resource allocation, could cause a different degree of transfer. Also, as the tax is formally
levied not on capital but on owners of other less mobile production factors, a tax that appears to fall on
capital could be maintained, but only because in practice it would actually fall on the rest of the factors
of production.
Another explanation for the survival of capital taxation in open economies can be found in the profit
principle, by which taxes are related to the level of public expenditure which benefits capital. Taxation
based on the profit principle stimulates efficiency in allocating public sector resources, among other
reasons, because it provides consumers with an indicator to the relative costs of public services in the
various jurisdictions, and this limits overexpansion of the public sector and promotes efficiency
(Zodrow, 1994). In similar fashion, taxes can be imposed which take advantage of location rents. In
these cases, capital invested in obtaining profits could be taxed without generating excess taxes,
understood as a lesser amount of capital entry flows or a greater level of outgoing flows.
Use of the imputation system as a correction mechanism for double taxation means the tax burden can
be exported from the source country to the country of residence (Mintz, 1992), since the tax borne by
the capital in the source country is used to reduce the owners' tax debt in their country of residence
(Damus, Hobson and Thirsk, 1991). If a country importing capital reduces its tax, rather than causing
investment flow, it could only cause a transfer of the tax base from importing countries to exporting
countries (Gordon, 1990). This problem would mean that the absence of harmonization combined with
the full imputation system could place the capital taxation level above the optimum level (CEPS,
1992).
Some hypotheses used by theoretical models which warn about the danger of capital flight are not
altogether correct. Specifically, the one which affirms that there are investment possibilities in third
countries that do not tax, and the one which holds that capital is perfectly mobile. With respect to the
first, even though there are foreign investment possibilities not subject to taxation, it is also true that
even tax havens have established some type of tax. Adding evasion costs, these levels would be the3 Fiscal competition implications for fairness 11
floor to which taxation could be reduced in developed countries. One of the reasons justifying the
present existence of capital taxation rests on capital still being relatively inmobile (Mussa and
Goldstein, 1993).
Finally, an important reason for making capital pay taxes is that it has greater mobility than the labor
factor. It is thus inferred that tax on profit that treats both types of profit means higher tax on capital
than on labor. Thus, globalization and integration of the world economy forces a change of
comprehensive tax on profits toward taxes of bonds only. This type tax is less onerous for more
mobile tax bases, e.g., financial capital returns, and maintains a greater tax levy on less mobile tax
bases, such as return on labor. This process has already begun in some countries and will grow in
future. Also,  corporate taxes do not have to disappear, since the objective sometimes is not to obtain
income but to dissuade the practice of fiscal trade-offs between labor profits for individuals and
corporations or in-country and out-of-country investment. In this sense, one of the main functions of
corporate tax is to reduce individuals' opportunities to transfer their labor profits to a corporate tax
base (Gordon and Mackie Mason, 1995), because then labor profits would either not pay tax or would
pay a lesser tax.
In all, the hypothetical disappearance of capital taxation does not have to be as negative a priori as is
thought. First, because if it were to occur, capital taxation could become tax on inmobile factors, such
as labor or real estate (Hubbard, 1993), especially when this transfer improves the economic welfare
from an efficiency point of view (Jones, Manuelli and Rossi, 1993; Zhu, 1992; Cahari, Christiano and
Kehoe, 1994), which could alleviate any negative effects on fairness.
There is widespread belief that capital taxation damages economic activity by not stimulating
investment. This explains the argument that if capital taxation is reduced, it could stimulate
investment, create jobs, improve competitiveness, and automatically increase earnings of national
factors. Additionally, if the tax is transferred to the labor factor, its suppression could lead to an
increase in labor earnings or greater creation of jobs that would better redistribute earnings in the
country (Domingo, 1983).
Lastly, empirical evidence indicates that one of the main determining factors of growth is capital
taxation (King and Rebelo, 1990; Razin and Yuen, 1995). This leads to the conclusion that a less
developed country can converge toward higher earnings levels if it uses capital taxation less intensely
than those countries with which it wishes to converge. As a result, if countries with different levels of
development are obliged to follow the same capital taxation plan, differences between them could be
perpetuated (Bernaldo de Quirós, 1995).HARMONIZATION AND TAX COMPETITION 12
4 CONCLUSION
In view of the work presented, it does not seem probable that capital taxation will be guided in Europe
by harmonization, especially when some countries show such marked reluctance to accept it, and
unanimity is required to vote it through. This hypothesis is not as negative as some would believe,
especially since it helps to reduce distortions that capital taxation generates in economic activity.
Nonetheless, several problems may appear in this scenario. It is possible that without harmonization,
tax revenues will fall to such low levels that it affects the redistributive ability of public budgets. This
is a real risk, but, as has been shown, not to the degree that some indicate, and, as a positive
counterweight, competition introduces an additional discipline mechanism for the public sector.
Nonetheless, if excessive fiscal competition surfaces, unacceptable for some EU countries, it seems
reasonable to accept some measures that could fit within the so-called harmonization of essentials, or
levelling of the playing field, but only if its approval and application in the European Union is guided
by prudence when pondering the different objectives and, if possible, without ignoring the opinion of
any member country. In this context, we should welcome the recent ”code for good fiscal practices”
approved by the European Council in Dublin, in order to avoid an excessive fiscal competition, instead
of introducing a deeper compulsory tax harmonization that would have even more negative
consequences as mentioned above.
It should suffice for now to undertake measures that help to establish a stable framework that can take
advantage of the virtues of competition without triggering of its negative defects. The first such
measure should be to extend the double taxation agreements in accordance with the principle of source
in order to reach CIN, since reduced distortions resulting from such a change would improve the
economic welfare of the European Union as a whole without excessively affecting the loss of
sovereignty. The second measure would fix a rate band within which member-country tax rates would
fit. This band would include values far below those considered by the Ruding Committee, because in
this way dispersion indices would come down, the risk of capital flight to third countries would
diminish, some of the distortion generated by taxation at the national level would be corrected, and the
practice of fiscal planning consistent with transfer of tax bases of high-tax countries to low-tax
countries would be reduced. Additionally, this band would have to incorporate some automatic
adjustment mechanism to help EU member countries react against changes in third countries'
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CHART 1




40 % 35 % 30 % 25 % 20 % 15 % 10 %
U.K. 5,80 6,20 5,91 5,66 5,45 5,28 5,13 5,00 U.K.
Holland 5,58 6,24 5,98 5,76 5,58 5,42 5,29 5,18 Holland
Germany 6,35 5,91 5,66 5,45 5,28 5,14 5,02 4,92 Germany
Austria 6,16 6,52 6,21 5,95 5,73 5,54 5,38 5,23 Austria
Belgium 5,45 5,48 5,35 5,25 5,17 5,11 5,07 5,03 Belgium
Denmark 5,93 6,24 5,97 5,75 5,57 5,41 5,28 5,17 Denmark
Spain 5,62 5,85 5,62 5,43 5,27 5,13 5,02 4,93 Spain
Finland 5,20 5,78 5,54 5,35 5,20 5,07 4,96 4,87 Finland
France 5,53 5,86 5,61 5,41 5,24 5,10 4,99 4,89 France
Greece 6,05 6,02 5,79 5,61 5,46 5,33 5,23 5,14 Greece
Ireland 5,72 5,62 5,43 5,27 5,14 5,04 4,96 4,89 Ireland
Italy 5,13 5,22 5,09 4,98 4,90 4,84 4,79 4,76 Italy
Luxembourg 5,22 5,37 5,26 5,18 5,11 5,07 5,03 5,01 Luxembourg
Portugal 5,36 5,52 5,36 5,22 5,12 5,03 4,96 4,91 Portugal
Sweden 5,74 6,42 6,12 5,87 5,66 5,48 5,33 5,20 Sweden
AVERAGE UE 5,66 5,88 5,66 5,48 5,32 5,20 5,10 5,01 AVERAGE UE
S.D. 0,36 0,39 0,33 0,28 0,24 0,20 0,17 0,15 S.D.
S.M.Pearson 0,06 0,07 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 SM.Pearson
Source: Author’s calculationsAppendix 19
CHART 2
THE COST OF CAPITAL WITH HARMONIZATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION
CORRECTIVE MECHANISMS





U.K. 5,80 5,75 5,86 6,07 U.K.
Holland 5,58 5,28 5,38 5,58 Holland
Germany 6,35 6,35 6,45 6,66 Germany
Austria 6,16 5,82 5,93 6,16 Austria
Belgium 5,45 5,13 5,24 5,45 Belgium
Denmark 5,93 5,62 5,72 5,93 Denmark
Spain 5,62 5,61 5,71 5,93 Spain
Finland 5,20 5,22 5,32 5,51 Finland
France 5,53 5,57 5,67 5,88 France
Greece 6,05 5,71 5,82 6,05 Greece
Ireland 5,72 5,67 5,77 5,99 Ireland
Italy 5,13 5,19 5,29 5,50 Italy
Luxembourg 5,22 4,93 5,03 5,22 Luxembourg
Portugal 5,36 5,28 5,38 5,60 Portugal
Sweden 5,74 5,45 5,55 5,74 Sweden
AVERAGE UE 5,66 5,50 5,61 5,82 AVERAGE UE
S.D. 0,36 0,35 0,35 0,36 S.D.
S.M.Pearson 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 S.M.Pearson
Source: Author’s calculationsAppendix 20
CHART 3
THE COST OF CAPITAL WITH HARMONIZATION OF MECHANISMS FOR






U.K. 5,80 5,56 5,38 5,80 5,49 5,80 U.K.
Holland 5,58 5,30 4,85 5,58 5,58 5,79 Holland
Germany 6,35 6,24 5,84 6,35 5,78 5,91 Germany
Austria 6,16 5,53 4,79 6,16 6,16 6,49 Austria
Belgium 5,45 5,69 4,75 5,45 5,45 5,86 Belgium
Denmark 5,93 5,86 5,49 5,93 5,60 5,93 Denmark
Spain 5,62 5,26 4,63 5,62 5,45 5,97 Spain
Finland 5,20 5,21 5,17 5,20 4,98 5,20 Finland
France 5,53 5,48 5,34 5,53 5,22 5,53 France
Greece 6,05 5,76 4,76 6,05 6,05 6,48 Greece
Ireland 5,72 5,97 5,62 5,72 5,29 5,72 Ireland
Italy 5,13 5,23 4,58 5,13 5,13 5,49 Italy
Luxembourg 5,22 5,50 4,79 5,22 5,22 5,54 Luxembourg
Portugal 5,36 5,33 4,64 5,36 5,36 5,72 Portugal
Sweden 5,74 5,57 5,37 5,74 5,50 5,74 Sweden
AVERAGE UE 5,66 5,57 5,07 5,66 5,48 5,81 AVERAGE UE
S.D. 0,36 0,30 0,41 0,36 0,32 0,34 S.D.
S.M.Pearson 0,06 0,05 0,08 0,06 0,06 0,06 S.M.Pearson
Source: Author’s calculations